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"PROJECT EXILE" AND THE ALLOCATION OF
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
Daniel C. Richman*

I. INTRODUCTION
With each report of violent crime statistics (whether rising or falling) or
of the latest firearms outrage, we hear the antiphony of the gun control debate.
Advocates of increased federal regulation decry the inadequacies of a regime that
permits relatively free access to firearms and argue that the availability of guns is
itself a spur to more deadly violence. Advocates of minimal regulation, for their
part, condemn measures that, they say, will primarily penalize law-abiding
citizens, and instead call for more vigorous enforcement of existing laws, targeting
"criminals," not their weapons. When the antiphony intrudes on funerals, the
effect can be jarring. But these are time-honored themes, which can be heard as
loudly in the debate surrounding the Gun Control Act of 1968' as they can today.
These themes echoed (albeit in muted form) in the 2000 presidential and

congressional campaigns, 2 in Attorney General John Ashcroft's confirmation

Professor, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Sara Sun Beale,
Jim Comey, Susan Ginsberg, Jerry Lynch, Bill Stuntz for their insightful comments. Also
thanks to Bernard Harcourt for organizing the 2001 conference on Guns, Crime, and
Punishment at the James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona (Jan. 26-27,
2001).
1.
Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
2.
See Juliet Eiperin & Thomas B. Edsall, ForDemocrats, Gun Issue Is Losing
Its Fire, WASH. POsT, Oct. 20, 2000, at Al ("Many House and Senate Democrats have
found that gun control is not resonating in many key contests like other issues, such as
prescription drugs."); see also James Dao, The 2000 Campaign: Endorsements; To Help
Bush, N.R.A. Withholds Backing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at A23; Excerpts from
Platform Approved by Democratic National Convention, N.Y. TitMS, Aug. 16, 2000, at
A26; Excerpts From Platform Approved by Republican National Convention, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2000, at A16; Joan Lowy, PresidentialHopefuls FarApart on Means to Curb Grn
Violence, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 16, 2000, at 12A; Megan Twohey, Bush
and Gore's Positionson Gun Control, 32 NAT'L J. 1036 (2000); Peter Wallsten, Gun Laus
Gain Prominence in CampaignsAs Democrats Seek to Regain Control of Congress,CO*G.
Q.WEEKLY, Mar. 18,2000, at 1-3.
*
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hearings,' and will surely be heard in the future. There is one note of virtual
unanimity however: The Eastern District of Virginia United States Attorney's
Office's Project Exile has been a stupendous success and ought to be replicated (to
one degree or another) wherever gun violence threatens the social fabric.
Conceived in late 1996, Project Exile (in its original form) targeted gun
violence in the Richmond area by funneling all gun arrests made by state and local
authorities to federal court, where, if at all possible, defendants were to be
prosecuted under federal firearm statutes. Among other things, these statutes
criminalize the possession of a firearm by those previously convicted of felonies
or crimes of domestic violence,4 and the use or possession of a firearm in
connection with drug trafficking.5 Exile also had "an innovative community
outreach and education initiative, using various media to get the message to the
criminals that illegal guns are unacceptable, and will not be tolerated." 6
Project Exile's political reviews have varied in intensity (and perhaps, as
we will see, in candor), but hardly in partiality. In May 1999, Attorney General
Janet Reno touted the Richmond program during congressional testimony.7 A
week later, in a radio address, President Clinton announced that he had just
directed Reno and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin to use every available tool to
increase the prosecution of gun criminals and shut down illegal gun markets:
I'm asking them to work closely with local, state, and federal law
enforcement officials, and to report back to me with a plan to reduce
gun violence by applying proven local strategies to fight gun crime
nationwide.
Look what federal prosecutors and the ATF are doing in
Richmond, Virginia, in an effort they call Project Exile. Under the
leadership of U.S. Attorney Helen Fahey, Project Exile has used the
threat of tough federal statutes.. .to reduce gun crime and take

3.
See Day IV, Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Nomination of John Ashcroft to Be U.S. Attorney General, Jan. 19, 2001, available in
LEXIS, Federal News Service file.

4.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994). Although the provision requires that the

possession was in or affecting interstate commerce, the government can usually prove this
element with ease, using expert testimony from an ATF agent. See, e.g., United States v.
Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ware, 914 F.2d 997, 998 (7th Cir.
1990); United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1989).
5.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
6.
Review of Dep't of Justice Firearm Prosecutions, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight and the Subcomm. on Youth Violence, Senate
Judiciary Comm., 106 t'Cong. 201 (1999) [hereinafter FirearmProsecutions],available at
<http:/frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgrdbname=106.senate.hearings&docid=
f:59738.wais> at 36 (statement of Helen F. Fahey).
7.
See Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate
ConcerningJustice Department Oversight (May 5, 1999), available at <http://Avww.usdoj.

gov/archive/ag/testimony/1999/agjudicO5O599.htm> (statement of Attorney General Janet
Reno).
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serious gun criminals off the street. And gun murders are down in
Richmond by a remarkable forty-one percent 8
During the election campaign, Vice President Gore was a little more
circumspect, though he generally avowed the need for "tough penalties for gun
trafficking, and all crimes committed with guns" and pledged to "work with the
states that want to end the practice of plea bargaining for crimes committed with
guns." 9 But congressional Democrats have been quite explicit in their support. On
March 21, 2000, three of the Party's gun reform stalwarts, Senator Charles
Schumer .(D-N.Y.), Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.), and Representative
Carolyn McCarthy (D-N.Y.) introduced the "Act for Effective, National Firearms
Objectives for Responsible, Common Sense Enforcement 2000" ("ENFORCE"), 0
which, according to McCarthy, would "establish partnerships between state and
federal prosecutors to expand successful enforcement programs like Project
Exile.""
The more casual observer of the gun control debate might not be
particularly surprised by these expressions of the Clinton Administration and
congressional Democrat favor. After all, Project Exile was developed under the
aegis of a Democratic U.S. Attorney, 12 as part of Attorney General Janet Reno's
Anti-Violent Crime Initiative. He might, however, be taken aback to find that the
strongest praise has come from different quarters. In June 1999, Governor George
W. Bush appeared in Richmond to endorse Exile and call for its implementation
nationwide. 3 Bush's campaign web-site proclaimed that he "[s]upports stronger
enforcement of existing gun laws, and [would] provide more funding for
aggressive gun law enforcement programs such as Project Exile in Richmond,
Virginia."' 4 And in the debates between the two candidates, it was the Governor,

8.
See Radio Address of the Presidentto the Nation (Gun Violence) (Mar. 20,
1999), available at <http'//ojjdp.ncjrs.orglabout/pressfojp990320.html>; see also Joe
Lockhart, White House Press Briefing, at 4 (visited Mar. 14, 2000), available at
<http:llwww.pub.whitehouse.govluri-.Joma.eop.gov.us/20001311418.text.l> (noting the
Administration's support of Project Exile).
9.
Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Vice President Al Gore, Boston, Mass.,
(visited June 7, 2000), available at <http'lwww.algore2OOOlspeeheslspeches
crime)071299.html>.
10.
H.R. 4066, 106' Cong. (2000).
11.
Newsfrom Congresswoman Carolyn MlcCarthy (Mar. 21, 2000), availableat
<http:llwvw.house.gov/carolynmccarthy/stmtgunsenforcebill.htm>.
12.
President Clinton appointed Helen F. Fahey to be U.S. Attorney for the
Eastern District of Virginia after she was recommended to the post by Virginia's
Democratic Senator, Charles S. Robb. Fahey, who at the time was Arlington County's
Commonwealth's Attorney, was described as "a veteran prosecutor and longtime
Democrat." Kent Jenkins, Jr. & Charles NV. Hall, Robb Picks Women for Legal Posts, 2
from N. Va. TappedforProsecutor,Judge, WASH. PosT, May 25, 1993, at C1.
13.
R.H. Melton, Bush Favors Va.-Style Gun Control, CandidateHas National
Hopesfor ProgramPenalizingFelons, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1999, at A8.
14.
See An Urban Agenda for the 21' Century, georgewbush.com (June 12,
2000) <http://www.georgewbush.comnews.aspfonnMode=NRSID=1606>.
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not the Vice President, who singled out Exile for special praise." Support from
congressional Republicans has, if anything, been stronger. In March 1999,
Republican Senators held hearings extolling the project's virtues, 6 and in March
2000, Representative Bill McCollum (R-Fla.), along with House Majority Leader
Dick Armey (R-Tex.) and others, sponsored "Project Exile: The Safe Streets and
Neighborhoods Act of 2000,"'" which sought to build on the "remarkable" success

of the Richmond Project by offering block grants to "those states that ensure a
mandatory five year prison sentence" to defendants of the sort targeted in
Richmond.' The Republican National Committee's Platform for 2000 broadly
promised: "Through programs like Project Exile, we will hold criminals
individually accountable for their actions by strong enforcement of federal and
state firearms law." 9

The less casual observer would probably not be particularly surprised by
this Republican enthusiasm for an ostensibly Democratic program. Project Exile
is, after all, quite consistent with the notion that gun regulation should leave "lawabiding" folks alone and target only misbegotten "criminals" (not to be confused
with people who merely violate firearms statutes that have criminal penalties)."
Indeed, one of the star witnesses at House hearings on Exile in November 1999
was Charlton Heston, president of the National Rifle Association ("NRA"), who
honored the "fearless prosecutors" who "employed the awesome simplicity of
enforcing existing federal gun law" and thereby "cut gun homicides by one-half in
just one year."' The NRA has not merely been commenting from the sidelines. It
has funded Project Exile's educational program in the Richmond public schools
and deployed its cartoon character "Eddie Eagle" on this sensitive mission.2" Yet

15.
Exchanges Between the Candidatesin the Third PresidentialDebate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2000, at A26.

16.

See generally Firearm Prosecutions, supra note 6; see also Senate

Committee on the Judiciary (Majority Staff), Crimes Committed with Firearms:A Report
for Parents, Prosecutors,and Policy Makers (Sept. 25, 1999), available at <http://wwvw.
senate.gov/-judiciary/guns106.htm>.
17.
H.R. 4051, 106' Cong. (Mar. 22, 2000).
18.
Hearing on Project Exile Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Housn
JuDIcIARY COMM. (Apr. 6, 2000), available at <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
mcco0406.htm> (statement by Chairman Bill McCollum).
19.
Excerptsfrom PlatformApproved by Republican NationalConvention, supra
note 2, at A16.
20.
See GARY KLECK, TARGETING GuNs: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 15
(1997).
21.
Charlton Heston, Congressional Testimony on Project Exile, House
GOVERNMENT REFORM SUBCOMM. (Nov. 4, 1999), available at <http://www.nraila.org/

news/19991104-CrimeControlJustice-002.html>; see also Hearing Before the House
Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Crime, Testimony of Wayne R. LaPierre,NRA Executive
Vice-President (May 27, 1999) availableat <http:llwww.house.gov/judiciaryllapierrehtm>
(noting NRA's support for Project Exile--"the fierce prosecution of federal gun laws that
has cut crime rates overnight in the few places it's been tried").
22.
See FirearmProsecutions,supranote 6, at 40 (statement of Helen F. Fahey).
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the NRA's nemesis, Sarah Brady, has also endorsed Exile on behalf of Handgun
Control, Inc.Y
What exactly is going on here? Part of the story, of course, is that no one
wants to come out against the prosecution of violent criminals with guns and that
politicians of all stripes believe that federal resources should be committed to that
end. But the bipartisan unanimity on the virtues of Project Exile masks deep
differences about its lessons. Indeed, the political saga of Exile has had more to do
with the negative implications of an Exile-based strategy than with the project's
obvious achievements. While the federal officials who established the program
simply addressed a perceived local emergency, Exile has carried far more freight
in the legislative arena, where the real issue has been whether federal firearms
enforcement efforts should go beyond such programs.
The implications of Exile politics go beyond the gun control debate, for
they may well mark a new stage in the devolution of federal enforcement power.
An inevitable consequence of the now longstanding presidential interest in
episodic (as opposed to organized) violent crime has been to shift control over
federal enforcement assets from Washington to U.S. Attorneys' Offices-the
entities best suited to assess and target local problems and to obtain the
cooperation of local authorities in the effort. The devolution, however, has not
gone much further than this, and the federal commitment of resources in this area
has been highly discretionary, varying by district, and balanced against the needs
of more national programs. Now comes Project Exile. Exile's institutional
significance lies not as a particular enforcement program-the effort of one U.S.
Attorney's Office to meet the needs of Richmond's residents-but rather in the
legislative movement it has spawned-a movement that would encourage and
institutionalize the elimination of federal prosecutorial gatekeeping.
The purpose of this article is to recount this saga, albeit somewhat
impressionistically, and to pursue its implications. The story is far from
complete-particularly now that Attorney General Ashcroft has proclaimed Exiletype programs to be one of his top priorities.24 But I've tried to capture its flavor
and highlights. Part II describes the origins of Project Exile in Richmond and tells
how one district's response to a violent crime problem became a potent, but
contested symbol in the gun control debate. For foes of the Clinton
Administration's regulatory agenda, eager to restrict federal activity in the area to
the prosecution of violent criminals, it became a sword. For the Clinton
Administration and other advocates of increased regulation, however, Exile
ultimately served as a shield, allowing them to trumpet the virtues of a larger
federal enforcement presence in the area. Part m sets out to assess the policy
implications of legislative efforts to make Exile a nationwide program and thereby
to commit federal agents and prosecutors to what otherwise would be local violent
crime cases. At first blush, the inquiry merely invites the recapitulation, in a more
particularized form, of the usual complaints about the "over-federalization" of

23.
24.

Id. at 43.
See infra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
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criminal law and the usual rejoinders.25 This does occur, but, once one (for better
or worse) takes federal targeting of gun violence as a political given, the question
becomes whether federal enforcers can play a qualitatively different role from
their state and local counterparts. And this question cannot be answered without
taking a position on the degree to which access to guns, and their interstate
movement, drives violent crime. Leaving this empirical conundrum unresolved,
Part IV explores the consequences for the federal enforcement bureaucracy of
legislative initiatives that threaten to irreversibly commit federal assets to the use
or control of state and local authorities.

II. PROJECT EXILE: ORIGINS, COMPONENTS AND
POLITICAL USES
A. Triggerlock
In the Spring of 1991, the battle over the Brady Bill,26 first introduced in
Congress in February 1987, was heating up again.27 Supporters could be
encouraged by the unexpected endorsement on March 28, 1991, of former
President Reagan who, in comments at the George Washington University

Medical Center (where he had been treated after the attempt on his life) urged
Congress to enact the bill "without delay."28 The (first) Bush Administration,
however, continued to oppose the legislation.29
It was against this backdrop that on April 10, 1991, Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh, with much fanfare, announced "Project Triggerlock," which
would use federal firearms statutes to "'protect the public by putting the most
dangerous offenders in prison for as long as the law allows."'' The idea,
Thornburgh had explained to U.S. Attorneys two weeks before, was to work with
local police agencies to identify repeat and violent offenders who used guns and to
prosecute them in federal court, where they would face "'the full force of federal
sentences with a commitment to no plea bargaining.""'3 When pressed by
reporters, one of Thomburgh's aides "denied that the order was an effort to blunt
mounting support in Congress" for the Brady Bill.32 A follow-up memorandum
25.

See NORMAN ABRAMS &

SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS

64-72 (3d ed. 2000) (setting out positions in debate).
26.
107 Stat. 1536, Pub. L. 103-159 (1993). The Brady Bill, ultimately passed as
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, imposed a system of background checks and
waiting periods designed to ensure that people in prohibited classes, especially convicted
felons, could not buy handguns.
27.
See OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BATTLE FOR
GUN CONTROL 247 (1998).
28.
See id. at 248.
29.
See ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 123 (2d ed. 1998).
30.
Tracy Thompson, Gun Crimes Targeted by Prosecutors: National Effort
Seen As Partly Political, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1991, at A14 (quoting Attorney General
Richard Thomburgh).
31.
Thornburgh Orders Drive on Gun Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at
A20 (quoting Attorney General Thornburgh).
32.
Id.
ENFORCEMENT
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from the head of the Criminal Division instructed each U.S. Attorney to appoint a
Triggerlock task force involving federal, state, and local representatives to develop
an enforcement strategy for the district and suggested that one such strategy would
be to screen all state and local arrests with each district for cases involving
predicate felons in possession of weapons or involving firearms offenses.3
Responding to Thornburgh's initiative, U.S Attorneys' Offices
throughout the nation began to devote additional resources to the prosecution of
violent offenders under federal gun statutes.? Or, at least, those Offices
endeavored to raise the visibility of their existing efforts in that regard.'*
The then-U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia, for example,
noted that firearms violations had long been "a top priority" for his office, and
that, for the past three years, he had "assigned a full-time assistant to gun-related
cases." 6 Within the first six months after Triggerlock's announcement, 2651
defendants were charged nationwide. 7 Response to Triggerlock also came from
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF"), which, in August 1992,
announced "Operation Achilles Heel," an effort to work with state and local
authorities to round up more than 600 "of this nation's most violent criminals."'8

Project Triggerlock continued through the end of the Bush

Administration and into the Clinton Administration.39 The passage of the Brady
Bill in November 1993 and the approaching congressional elections (in which the
33.
See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 25, at 109-10.
34.
See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Bush Aides Push State Gun Cases into U.S.
Courts,N.Y. TIMEs, May 17, 1991, at Al.
35.
A recent report on case filings suggests that the biggest increase in federal
firearms prosecutions occurred before the announcement of Triggerlock. See Patrick
Walker & Pragati Patrick Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Trends in
FirearmsCases From Fiscal Year 1989 Through 1998, and the Workload Implicationsfor
the U.S. District Courts (Apr. 4, 2000) <httpJ/wvw.uscourts.gov/fireannsf
firearms00.html>.
For examples of the promotion of Triggerlock, see, e.g. 1992 U.S. ATr'Y's
OFFICE, S. DIsT. OF N.Y., REP., at 3 (1992) (noting how, as part of Operation Triggerlock,
the Office had developed a "close relationship" with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms and "worked closely" with the New York City Police and Housing Police "to
address the gun epidemic through select application of justifiably harsh federal penalties to
repeat offenders carrying guns, illegal gun dealers, and those using guns in the course of
drug crimes and crimes of violence"); Christopher Kilboume, Police Add Ammunition
Against Gunmen: Cooperation Among Federal. State, Local Cops, THE RECORDER
(Bergen), Apr. 11, 1991, at A3 (explaining the goals of Triggerlock).
36.
Thompson, supra note 30, at A14.
37.
See ABRAMS & BEALE, supranote 25, at 110.
38.
PressConference of Stephen E. Higgins,Director,Bureau ofAlcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms(Aug. 22, 1991), availablein LEXIS, Federal News Service file.
39.
See Howard Mintz, Heavy Artillery: In Project Triggerloca; the Justice
Department Pulls Felons out of the State System and Subjects Them to Long Federal
Sentences Under Tough Gun Lmvs. Defense Lawsyers and Some Judges Say the ProgramIs
a Cannon Where a Pistol Would Do, THE RECORDER, Feb. 8, 1993, at I (containing a part of
special report on Triggerlock in San Francisco); Judy Rokowsky, Number of Guns Seized in
Boston Decreases; Police Credit Lav Enforcement Efforts, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1994,
at 31.
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Republicans were to gain control of Congress) put the program in the spotlight
once again in the spring of 1994, with Republicans charging that it had been
abandoned by the new Administration.40 At a September House hearing, convened
at the request of Republican Steven Schiff (R-N.M.), Assistant Attorney General
Jo Ann Harris, chief of the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice
("DOJ'), avowed that Triggerlock remained "in full force" as an "important
component" of the Anti-Violent Crime Initiative that Vice President Gore and
Attorney General Reno had announced on March 1, 1994.41 She went on to note,
however, that although "some very sincere observers have expressed concern over
the small decline in the prosecutions under the federal firearms statutes in recent
months," the Department believed that "it is a much wiser and more productive
approach to focus our attention and resources on the quality of the investigations
initiated and prosecutions undertaken to identify and target those armed and
violent offenders responsible for the greatest amount of crime," particularly those
connected with gangs. 2 Thus, while the number of Triggerlock prosecutions had
somewhat declined, the average sentence in those cases was substantially higher in
1993, with a dramatic increase in the number of defendants sentenced to five years
or more.4" As for the other cases, Harris observed:
Many states, and localities, have been working to toughen their own

firearm statutes thus lessening the need in many instances to bring
certain cases in federal court. These new local prosecutions often are
achieved with the cooperation and involvement of federal law
enforcement and prosecution agencies consistent with the
partnerships that have been developed in the Anti-Violent Crime
Initiative.44
In any event, Harris testified, prosecutions alone would not solve the
problem of violent crime: "[W]e all know that the best way to prevent crime with
guns is to stop criminals before they get the guns."'"
Harris's point about the need to focus on access to firearms and illegal
firearms trafficking, as well as enforcing criminal use and possession statutes, was
40.
James A. Baker III, Crime, Promises-Had Enough?, Hous. CHRON., Mar.
6, 1994, at Outlook 1; Joyce Price, 2 Facesof Gun Control at Justice?Congressman Says It
Isn't EnforcingKey Anti-Crime Law, WASH. TIMES, May 21, 1994, at A5.
41.
See Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime and CriminalJustice of the House Judiciary Comm, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1994)
[hereinafter Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes]; see also 1994 ANNUAL REPORT OF TIE
ATrORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6, available at <www.ussdoj.gov/ag/
annualreports/ar94/finalag.txt> (describing Initiative).
42.
Prosecutionof Federal Gun Crimes, supra note 41, at 4-5 (testimony of Jo
Ann Harris).
43.
See id. at 13; 14 n.1, 46 (statement of Jo Ann Harris). Although Assistant
Attorney General Harris made no mention of the hiring freeze on Assistant U.S. Attorneys
between April 1993 and September 1994, a recent Administrative Office study cites the
freeze as the primary cause of the decrease in federal firearms cases during this period. See
Walker & Patrick, supra note 35, at 3.
44.
Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes, supra note 41, at 5 (testimony of Jo
Ann Harris).

45.

Id.
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reiterated at the hearing by ATF's Associate Director for Law Enforcement, who
reported that ATF had designed its enforcement programs "to target the most
prolific violent offenders and illegal firearms traffickers."' In addition to its
"Achilles Program," aimed at "armed career offenders, convicted felons, and
armed drug traffickers in cities across the nation,"47 ATF had a "Juvenile Firearms
Trace Initiative" "to identify and eliminate sources of firearms to juveniles. "
Under questioning by then-Congressman Schumer, the ATF official spoke of the
agency's need to "come up with a new strategy for gun shows and flea markets,"
the large "secondary market' that was substantially unregulated even after the
passage of the Brady Bill.49
One can tease several policy strains out of the DOJ-ATF presentation at
this hearing. While asserting a continued commitment to pursuing federal firearms
prosecutions of predicate felons and violent offenders, Clinton Administration
officials sought to expand the focus of federal enforcement activities to include
trafficking violations and other regulatory activity. State and local enforcers were
to pursue the use and possession cases whenever possible. In late 1994, officials in
the Office of Management and Budget went so far as to propose a twenty-five
percent reduction in ATF's agent workforce, with the savings to be spent on local
and state police grants?0 The proposal was soon abandoned, after considerable
outcry from within the law enforcement community,"' but the notion of wholesale
federal adoption of firearms cases certainly seemed to be disfavored.
Triggerlock prosecutions continued into 1995, with U.S. Attorneys and
ATF trumpeting each new pushs2 and Republicans like freshman Senator Mike
DeWine (R-Ohio) calling for the program's "resurrect[ion]. ' "

46.
Id. at 28 (statement of Charles Thompson, Associate Director Law
Enforcement, ATF).
47.
Id. at 29-30.
48.
Id. at 35.
49.
Id. at 43-44.
50.
See Why Pass Gun Laws, Then Fire the Enforcers?, USA TODAY, Nov. 30,
1994, at 10A; see also FirearmProsecutions,supra note 6, at 18 (testimony of Andrew L.
Vita) (noting that certain 0MB examiners had "considered the possibility that [Project]
Achilles was a duplication of what state and local law enforcement should be doing, and
that the federal program should be directed more at curtailing the flow of firearms [] into
those communities!).
51.
See Pierre Thomas & Ann Devroy, Treasury Official Blasts ATF Cuts; Rare
Public Criticism CallsPlan "Out of Sync " with Policy, WASH. PoST, Dec. 17, 1994, at Al.
52.
See, e.g., Kevin Bouffard, Sebring Looks to Felon Program; Under the
Federal "OperationTriggerlock," the City Will Be Able to Put Armed and Violent Career
CriminalsBehind Barsfor at Least 15 Years, TAimPA TRIB., Aug. 29, 1995, at Heartland 1;
Jed Row, Officials Zero in on Armed CareerFelons, NEWs & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.),
Sept. 4, 1995, atB1.
53.
See Tom Diemer, Dewine Bill Promises More Police, PLAN DEAXL
(Cleveland, Ohio), May 18, 1995, at 9A.
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B. ProjectExile

Although the DOJ Criminal Division chief spoke forcefully about
Attorney General Reno's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative, she candidly admitted that
the Initiative would have to be implemented by theU.S. Attorney in each district,
and that these officials, responding to local problems and personalities, "must of
necessity make their own policies with respect to where they put their
resources." 54 In a way, this was something of an understatement. Although the
extent of U.S. Attorneys' independence from Washington can vary considerably
(with a direct relation between the size of a U.S. Attorney's Office and its
independence),55 most, if not all, have traditions of autonomy, fortified by the
relationships between their leaders and the political powers within their respective
districts.56 This autonomy extends to every area of federal criminal enforcement
but is particularly great when the federal government turns to violent street crime.
When federal enforcers pursue traditional organized crime investigations
or patrol the securities markets or diplomatic community, they can develop and
substantially rely on their own informational networks.5 When their focus turns
toward more episodic criminal activity, like street violence, they must depend to a
considerable degree on local police departments, "the only entities whose tentacles
reach every street comer."5" "Main Justice" understandably recognized that the
necessary cooperation of state and local officials with its anti-violence initiative
could be achieved only through distinctive working arrangements that U.S.
Attorneys negotiated district by district.
The peculiar status of U.S. Attorneys' Offices as local repositories of
federal prosecuting authority was also well suited to an initiative that, quite selfconsciously, plunged into an area of traditionally local responsibility. Equally well
suited in this regard was the law enforcement agency that was to play a leading
role in bringing firearms cases to prosecutors. These cases, of course, fell squarely
within the statutory bailiwick of the ATF.59 Moreover, perhaps more importantly,
ATF had for some time responded to its political vulnerability in Washington by

54.
55.

ProsecutionofFederalGun Crimes,supra note 41, at 47-48.
See JAMES EISENSTEN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S.

IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 116-17

ATrORNEYS

(1978).

56.
See Daniel C. Richman, Federal CriminalLaw, CongressionalDelegation,
and Enforcement Discretion,46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 781, 785 (1999).
57.
See id. at 785.
58.
Id. at 786.
59.
ATF was not, however, the only federal enforcement agency involved in
anti-violence programs. The FBI had begun committing substantial resources to this area in
the last year of the Bush Administration. See David Johnston, F.B.I. to Shij from Cold War
to Crime War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at A18; Daniel C. Riehman, The Changing
Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement, in BOUNDARY CHANGES IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS, 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000 94 (National Institute of
Justice, NCJ 182409, July 2000), available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

nij/criminaljustice2OOO/vol2_2OOO.html>. That agency's efforts continued under the
Clinton Administration, which deemed them a part of its Anti-Violent Crime Initiative. See
1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 41, at 44.
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working particularly hard on its relationships with local enforcers.t With the
debacle at Waco still a lingering memory, ATF could be counted on to be
particularly accommodating in this regard.6'
From out of these political and institutional currents came Project Exile.
In February 1997, responding to a plague of gun violence that gave Richmond one
of the top five per capita murder rates in the country, the Eastern District of
Virginia U.S. Attorney's Office announced its "aggressive, innovative, and
creative approach to reducing the murder rate, by changing the culture of
violence ...through a comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy" that included
"law enforcement and prosecution components aimed at deterrence, as well as
community outreach and education programs focusing on prevention."
Exile's law enforcement component, initiated in coordination with the
local Commonwealth's Attorney's Office, the Virginia Attorney General's Office,
the Richmond Police Department, the Virginia State Police, ATF, and the FBI was
quite straightforward: 'When a police officer finds a gun during the officer's
duties, the officer pages an ATF agent (twenty-four hours a day). They review the
circumstances and determine whether a federal statute applies. If so, federal
criminal prosecution is initiated."
As a practical matter, this process generally required that criminal
charges initially be brought against a suspect in state court, to be dropped if the
case was taken federally.6 One federal official "said that most of those arrested
under the program might initially be released on bond by city magistrates, but
'we'll quickly scoop them up. '""'
The benefits of taking cases federally, according to the U.S. Attorney's
Office, flowed from the federal bail statute, which allowed pre-trial detention on
the ground of dangerousness; the federal system of mandatory minimums and
sentencing guidelines, which limited sentencing discretion and resulted in
predicable and substantial sentences, and the federal prison system, which made it

60.
See WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, INTHE CRoss FIRE: A PoLImCAL HisroRy OF THE
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREArms 89 (1997); William A. Geller & Norval
Morris, Relations Between Federaland Local Police,in 15 MODERN POLCiNG 231, 247 n.8
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992); Richman, supra note 56, at 796.
61.
See VizzARD, supra note 60, at 189-207 (describing upheaval within ATF in
wake of failed raid on Branch Davidian compound near Vaco, Texas).
62.
FirearmProsecutions,supra note 6, at 36 (statement of Helen F. Fahey).

63.

Id.at 5. James Comey, Managing Assistant U.S. Attorney and Chief

Criminal Supervisor in Richmond-the "chief midwife" of Exile-has described Exile as
"'Triggerlock on steroids."' Get Out of Town!: Richmond'sProjectExile Stems a Spiralof
Fiolence with Its Focus on Gun-Toting Felons, LAw ENFORCF.iENT NEws, Dec. 15/31,
1999 (visited May 31,2000), availableat <vww.lib.jjay.cuny.edulen/1999112.301>.
64.
See, ag, United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304,307 (E.D. Va. 1999).
65.
Tom Campbell & Gordon Hickey, Project Exile Aims to Break Guns, Drugs
Link; Ciy Wants Federal Arrests, Stiff Sentences, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 22,
1999, at B1.
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likely that any sentence would be served "elsewhere in the country" (hence the
idea of "exile").'
At its outset, Exile involved a considerable commitment of federal
enforcement resources. The official at the U.S. Attorney's Office most involved in
the program's initiation acknowledged that it "[wa]s going to be a big load" but
one worth taking on because of its impact on violent crime in Richmond. 67 The
staffing of prosecutions appears to have changed over time, however, because two
years later the Office could tout the "relatively limited personnel resources" that
the project required-just three
prosecutors, some of whom had been detailed
6
from state and local offices. 8
Exile had an educational component as well. Initially, the U.S. Attorney's
Office distributed cards for police officers to hand out on the beat-cards
proclaiming the federal penalties for gun possession crimes and carrying the
' But with financial support from the "Project Exile
slogan: "Stop the Madness."69
Citizen Support Foundation," a "media outreach" effort soon made the message
"An Illegal Gun Gets You Five Years in Federal Prison" ubiquitous-on
billboards, TV commercials, supermarket bags, and a city bus.7 ° Elementary
school children received gun safety training. This program, "the Eddie Eagle Gun
Safety Program," was obtained ready-made, however-a gift from the NRA. 7'
The effects of the Project were impressive (or, at least, were uniformly
perceived as such).7' Within two weeks of announcing Exile, the U.S. Attorney's
Office, working with local authorities and the ATF, had obtained fifty-nine
indictments under the project.7' Firearms seizures by the Richmond Police
Department were soon down by 48%. 7' By March 1999, the number of
indictments had reached 438,75 and the Office could give at least partial credit to

66.
See FirearmProsecutions,supra note 6, at 38 (statement of Helen F. Fahey).
67.
See Campbell & Hickey, supra note 65, at B 1.
68.
See Firearm Prosecutions, supra note 6, at 38-39 (statement of Helen F.
Fahey).
69.
See Campbell & Hickey, supra note 65, at BI.
70.
See FirearmProsecutions,supra note 6, at 39 (statement of Helen F. Fahey).
71.
See id. at40.
72.
Determining the degree to which any drop in crime can fairly be attributed to
policing tactics is frightfully difficult. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, et al., DecliningHomicide in
New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277 (1998);
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception ofDeterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-MaintenancePolicing
New York Style, 97 MICH. L. Rsv. 291 (1998); Ana Joanes, Does the New York City Police
Department Deserve Creditfor the Decline in New York City's Homicide Rates? A CrossCity Comparison of Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBs. 265 (2000). This Article thus makes no such empirical claims about Exile.

73.
See Tom Campbell, Gun Users to FaceRigors of U.S. Case: 59 Are Indicted
in Local-FederalEffort, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 1997, at B5.
74.
See Tom Campbell, An "Exile" for Firearms"?; Some Gun-Totling
CriminalsFace FederalProsecution,RicHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, July 7, 1997, at Al.
75.
See FirearmProsecutions,supra note 6, at 39 (statement of Helen F. Fahey).
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the Project for a 33% reduction in the homicide rate between 1997 and 1998,
giving Richmond its lowest rate since 19876

C. PoliticalResponses to ProjectExile
Precisely how Project Exile has gained such prominence in national

policy circles is difficult to determine. The program's advertising and educational
components" ensured it a high profile in the region where it was implemented.
And perhaps federal, state, and local authorities in Virginia were particularly
assiduous in drawing national media attention to the program's (and their own)
success. However, the main story lies elsewhere.
Counterfactuals are always hard. Yet one could easily imagine a scenario
in which the Clinton Administration, while pursuing its gun control agenda of
expanding the Brady regime and policing the gun markets, seized upon Project
Exile-initiated by a Democratic appointee with the full support of federal
agencies-as evidence of its continued commitment to Triggerlock's goal of
getting armed criminals off the streets. The race to embrace Exile, however, was
won by the Administration's opponents. And to them goes the lion's share of
credit for Exile's place in gun control debates.
In June 1998, newly elected NRA president Charlton Heston touted
Exile's success, and executive director Wayne P, LaPierre followed up,
proclaiming that Exile "ought to be in every major city where there's a major gun
problem."78 To be sure, Sarah Brady, chairman of Handgun Control, also took care
to publicly commend Exile. 79 The NRA ran up its banner more visibly, however,
when, at the NRA's Philadelphia convention in June, it challenged the
Administration to bring Exile to Philadelphia." With the promise of dedicated
funding-thanks to the efforts of Republican Senator Arlen Spector (R-Pa.)-Philadelphia's Democratic Mayor Edward Rendell (then courting the 2000
Republican National Convention) 8' joined the call for importing Exile.
The Clinton Justice Department even appeared willing to cede political
control of Exile's symbolism to the Republicans. An August 31, 1998, Wall Street
Journalarticle, quoting officials at the U.S. Attorney's Office, told of their lack of
success at obtaining more prosecutors and agents from Washington.' And it
76.
See id. at 14; see also Michael Janofsky, Fighting Crime by MaAing a
FederalCaseAbout Guns, N.Y. TrIEs, Feb. 10, 1999, at A12.

77.

See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.

78.
R.H. Melton, Richmond Gun Project Praised: NRA Brady Group Laud
Automatic Sentencesfor Armed Felons, WASH. POST, June 18, 1998, at A13.

79.

See id.

80.
See Philadelphia Volunteers to Be Test Casefor NRA, Cm. TRIB., June 20,
1998, atN14.
81.
See Editorial, Philly's Coup; Another Example of Bipartisan Teamwork,

PSBURGH POST-GAzErE, Nov. 9, 1998, at A10 (commenting on announcement that 2000
Republican Convention would be in Philadelphia).
82.
See David S. Cloud, Prosecutor's Strategy Scrambles Gun-Control
Alliances,WALL ST. 1., Aug. 31, 1998 at 20 (reprinted in FirearmProsecutions,supra note

6, at 71-73).
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reported that the person who until recently had been Attorney General Reno's "top
aide on gun violence" had "dismisse[d] Project Exile as 'assembly line'
prosecutions that bleed resources from other law-enforcement priorities" and had
doubted that there was "any empirical evidence that Richmond's falling murder
rate is related to Project Exile." 3
On the eve of the 1998 congressional elections, Senate Republicans tried
to solidify their adoption effort. A Policy Committee release declared: "Instead of
crime control with quick and certain prosecution for those criminals who use
firearms in the commission of a crime, this Administration is bent on idealistic gun
control replete with more hurdles and more delays for legal gun owners. ' The
"solution," according to the release, was Project Exile, "perhaps the most
aggressive, innovative and creative crime control program ever initiated," which
the Republicans proposed be extended to Philadelphia." 5 The Policy Committee
also faulted the Administration for failing to prosecute convicted felons who had
tried to purchase firearms since the passage of the Brady Act but had been turned
down.86

If the Republican embrace were not enough, the new year presented the
Clinton Administration with another strike against Exile, this time in the form of
trenchant criticism from a three-judge panel of district judges in Richmond.87 One
effect of Exile (intended or otherwise, and there was some evidence of intent) was
to change the likely racial composition of juries in 'gun cases, since the federal
district court drew jurors from a broader geographic region.88 Exile defendants, the
vast majority of whom were African American, thus faced trial in front of juries in
which African American representation was likely to be significantly lower than it

would have been had the cases been prosecuted by the Commonwealth's Attorney
in Richmond. While rejecting, on January 26, 1999, a constitutional challenge
based on this fact, the panel opined at length on the extent to which Exile
represented "a substantial federal incursion into a sovereign state's area of
authority and responsibility," and an "abdication of responsibility for prosecuting
local crime" on the part of the state and local authorities.89 The judges noted that
Virginia's bail law and gun statutes were not markedly different from the federal
counterparts and even challenged the notion of "exile," pointing out that most
defendants ended up at the federal facility in Petersburg, Virginia.9"

83.
Id.
84.
U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, Release, Of Criminalsand Guns:
The 'ProjectExile' Solution, Sept 30, 1998, available at <www.senate.gov/~rpc/releases/
l998/ExiIe-kf.htm>.
85.
Id.
86.
See id.
87.
See United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304 (E.D. Va. 1999).
88.
See id. at 307-08.
89.
Id. at 316.
90.
Id. (noting that majority of convicted Exile defendants had been placed in
Petersburg, Virginia, facility, and observing that "ft]he Commonwealth of Virginia possess
numerous facilities more geographically removed from the City of Richmond than is the
federal facility in Petersburg").
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Asked about the court's decision the day after it was handed down,

Attorney General Reno was restrained in defending Exile, explaining:
There may be resource problems in some communities that require
one approach. There may be problems with state laws in other
communities that require a different approach. But, as I have
suggested to you before, we have had great success in Boston, for
example, where the U.S. Attorney and the local district attorney
worked together, the local district attorney taking most of the gun
cases, the U.S. Attorney, upon agreement, taking others. 9
The Department's position-"let a thousand flowers bloom, but Boston
may well be better"--would soon emerge at great length when, in February 1999,
it released a 253-page tome, PromisingStrategies to Reduce Gun Violence9 2 The
aim of the publication, according to Attorney General Reno's introduction, was to
create a '"toolbox' to provide law enforcement, state and local elected officials,
prosecutors, judges, community organizations, and other policymakers with
practical information about a range of strategies to reduce gun violence." 3 The
book's organization, though, had a more prescriptive purpose, setting out the
nature of the gun violence problem in its first section, then, in its second section,
outlining the "steps for developing and implementing a comprehensive gun
violence reduction plan."' The third section profiled "comprehensive gun
violence reduction strategies" in eight cities,
with significant attention to the
95
"Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence."
The "Boston Strategy," the book related, had three law enforcement
components. "Operation Ceasefire" targeted youth gangs, using probation and
gang unit officers to spread the word that violence would no longer be tolerated
and using "intensive order maintenance and enforcement tactics to quickly
suppress flareups up firearm violence in emerging gang hotspots."9' The "Boston
Gun Project" used trace data from crime weapons to "discover sources of illegal
weapons and gun-trafficking patterns .... The Boston Police Department and ATF
also conducted joint inspections of all federal firearms licensees 0 in Boston," a
tactic that drove eighty percent of these entities either to not renew or to give up

their licenses.97 "Operation Night Light" sent teams of probation and anti-gang
police officers to make nighttime visits to "high-risk youth probationers.6 3 The
"Boston Strategy" also included "intervention and prevention initiatives" that
helped gang members and at-risk youths get social services, job training, and

91.
Press Conference, Janet Reno, Attorney General, Jan. 28, 1999 (visited June
22, 2000), availableat <www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches!1999jan2899.htm>.
92.
See generally OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROMISING STRATEGIES TO REDUCE
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93.
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Id at 15-68.

96.

Id at 29.
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See id

384

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:2

conflict-resolution training.' The Department of Justice report attributed Boston's
dramatic decrease in homicides to the "cumulative impact of this comprehensive,
multipronged approach."''
After profiling "comprehensive" solutions, the DOJ report turned to what
it implicitly considered partial strategies, including: "strategies to interrupt sources
' '1 2
of illegal guns,"' 0 ' "strategies to deter illegal gun possession and carrying, 0
"strategies to respond to illegal gun use," and "education initiative and alternative
prevention strategies."' 3 It was in the next-to-last of these that it gave a short
description of Project Exile.' 4
The Clinton Administration's effort to downplay Exile's unique allure
soon ran into difficulties, as its opponents' publicity campaign began to pay off.
By the time the new Congress convened in early 1999, NRA and Republican
attention had propelled Exile to even greater prominence, with glowing reviews in
the New York Times,

s

USA Today,'0 6 and U.S. News

7

(to name a few). One

reporter presciently set the scene:
With the administration posed to send a sweeping new crime bill to
Congress, the National Rifle Association vows to wage a vigorous
fight against the proposed legislation-using Project Exile as its
main weapon. The NRA will try to persuade Congress that the
administration should put its resources into federal prosecutions of
gun crimes and not into new laws controlling the sale and
possession of guns.
The irony is that Attorney General Janet Reno actually
agrees with the NRA on Project Exile's promise-but not its
exclusivity. She will soon issue a directive to federal
prosecutors...urging them to consider implementing new programs
in their district like Project Exile. But the administration's new
crime package will include only $5 million for such efforts. Among
the other new provisions are background checks for buyers at gun
shows, a lifetime ban on gun possession by juveniles convicted of
certain violent crimes, and child safety locks on all guns. 1°'
This report may have somewhat understated Reno's support for Exile,
When she presented her budget request to a Senate Appropriations subcommittee
on March 9, she made clear that the five million dollars the DOJ was seeking for
"intensive firearms prosecution projects" would be spent only on new
99.

Seeid. at 31-32.

100.

Id. at 32-33.

101.
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105.
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106.
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prosecutors." The Administration was seeking other monies in other parts of the
budget to fund state prosecutors and ATF agents in connection with its gun
strategy."0 And she noted that the five million dollars would be used to build "on
the success achieved in reducing violent crime in Boston [] and Richmond."' I
President Clinton was less subtle. On March 20, 1999, just two days
before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing at which Republicans were
expected to criticize the Administration's record of gun prosecutions, the President
sought to reclaim Exile. In his radio address, he announced that he had just
directed Reno and Treasury Secretary Rubin to "use every available tool to
increase the prosecution of gun criminals and shut down illegal gun markets."" 2
Yet while Clinton characteristically gave equal emphasis to trafficking
enforcement, the only program he singled out for special mention was Exile
(which lacked any significant trafficking component). Applauding the work that
"federal prosecutors and the ATF are doing in Richmond," he vowed: "My
balanced budget will help to hire more federal prosecutors and ATF agents so we
can crack down on even more gun criminals and illegal gun trafficking all across
America.""' 3
While President Clinton had stolen a bit of their thunder, Senate
Republicans still proceeded with the March 22 hearing. There, Senators
Thurmond, Sessions, and Spector reminded everyone that Exile was really just an
extension of the (first) Bush Administration's "Triggerlock.' "' They were
"pleased" that the Administration was finally trying to extend Exile,' 'I but the fact
was that federal gun prosecutions had declined by forty-six percent between 1992
and 1998-a point they highlighted with testimony from a former U.S. Attorney
from the Bush Administration and a retired ATF agent, who explained why the
federal government needed to pursue street-level gun cases."'
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Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on
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114.
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115.
See id. at 2 (statement of Senator Strom Thurmond).
116.
See id. at 3. The TRAC project at Syracuse University has presented similar
figures. See New Findings on ATF Criminal Enforcement (visited May 25, 2000)
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A more textured story emerges from the recent report of the U.S. Court's
Administrative Office, which describes the fluctuations in federal gun filings between 1991
and 1998, and largely attributes decreases to, first, a hiring freeze on prosecutors and agents
between April 1993 and September 1994 and, thereafter, to the Supreme Court's December
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prosecutors' ability to charge violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See Walker & Patrick, supra
note 35, at 3-4.
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No one from Main Justice testified at this hearing, but, in their testimony,
U.S. Attorney Fahey and Boston's U.S. Attorney Donald K. Stem strove mightily
to situate Exile within the broader departmental strategy. Having spoken of Project
Exile's success in the particular context of Richmond, Fahey was careful to
explain that while every community would benefit from a coordinated antiviolence strategy, such programs would not necessarily have to involve federal
prosecutions of gun violations, which could be pursued by local authorities when
they had the resources to do so.1 7 Stem, too, noted that because of Massachusetts'
strict gun laws, "we don't have to do every case federally,""' and he told of his
district's efforts to go after gun traffickers and to promote violence prevention
projects." 9 Fahey also deflected the suggestion that the Administration had failed
to support Exile sufficiently. 0 ATF's Assistant Director for Field Operations,
Andrew L. Vita, no doubt basking in rare (and somewhat misleading) bipartisan
approval for his agency's work, emphasized the breadth and uniqueness of ATF's
role:
Unlike any other law enforcement agency, we have the combined

jurisdiction, expertise, and experience necessary to most
successfully investigate gun trafficking and gun violence. ATF's
unique assets, together with our renowned partnerships and
cooperation with law enforcement at every level makes this true.
and adequate resources, we can continue
With ongoing cooperation
2
to build on our success' 1
Asked by Senator Thurmond, somewhat rhetorically, whether "it would be
worthwhile" to spend more money than had been requested for Exile-type
projects, Vita hewed to the Administration's line: "Although Exile was extremely
successful in Richmond, I would be concerned about using it as a cookie-cutter
response to [] violent crime in other cities."'"
The shootings at Columbine High School, in Littleton, Colorado, on
April 20, 1999," 3 gave the Administration and its congressional allies new
momentum in their push for broader regulatory regimes. Within a week of the
tragedy, the President had proposed legislation to, among other things, restrict the
purchase of handguns to one per month, raise the minimum age for handgun
possession, and require background checks for firearms purchases at gun shows.,24
While Republicans like Orrin Hatch, pointing to the decrease in Triggerlock
prosecutions, suggested new laws would do little good if the Administration failed
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FirearmProsecutions,supra note 6, at 65 (testimony of Helen F. Fahey).
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See id. at 65-66.
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Id. at 14 (written statement of Andrew L. Vita) (emphasis in original).
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to enforce them," a greater receptivity to at least some new regulations 6 moved

Exile off center stage of the gun debate in the Senate.'27 Ultimately, after fits and
starts-which included the initial defeat of the Democrats' gun show provision,
the introduction of a somewhat similar Republican proposal the next day,'2 its
defeat, and the ultimate passage of the original Democratic proposal with help
from the Vice President's tie-breaking vote'R-the Senate passed regulatory
measures that, while falling far short of the Clinton Administration's proposals,
were enough to put the issue to rest, at least for the moment.'
While acceding to certain regulatory proposals, Senate Republicans
(including Senator John Ashcroft (R-Mo.)) made sure that the compromise
legislation also enshrined Exile in the "Criminal Use of Firearms by Felons
(CUFF) Act.'.' After applauding Triggerlock, bemoaning the decline in federal
firearms prosecutions between 1993 and 1998, and celebrating the success of
Exile in Richmond, the bill laid out the terms of a CUFF program. In twenty-five
high crime jurisdictions,3 2 the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury
were to:
(1) provide for coordination with state and local law enforcement
officials in the identification of violations of federal firearms
laws;
(2) provide for the establishment of agreements with state and
local law enforcement officials for the referral to the ATF and
the United States Attorney for prosecution of persons arrested
for violations of [various firearms offenses];

125.
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See Hearingon Justice Dep 't Oversight Before the Senate JudiciaryComm.

Cong. 31 (May 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Orrn Hatch).
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TIMES, May 21, 1999, at A23.
131.
S. 254, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. VIII, subtit. A (1999).
132.
See id. § 803(d). The programs were to be established in:
(1) the 10 jurisdictions vith a population equal to or greater than
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require that the United States Attorney designate not less than

one Assistant United States Attorney to prosecute violations of
federal firearms laws;
(4) provide for the hiring of agents for the ATF to investigate
violations of [designated firearms offenses]; and

(5) ensure that each person referred to the United States Attorney
under paragraph (2) be charged with a violation of the most
serious federal
firearm offense consistent with the act
33
committed.1
The bill required the Attorney General to submit annual reports as to the
number of assistants hired' 34 and the number and nature of prosecutions brought
under the program. It also authorized the appropriation of forty million dollars to
pay for assistants prosecuting CUFF cases and ATF agents investigating them,a and
ten million dollars to fund an education program like that used in Richmond. 3
The action then moved to the House, where a juvenile crime bill
proposed by Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.), the chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee's Crime subcommittee, was thought (by Democrats at least) to be the
"likely vehicle" for any new gun regulatory measures. 3 6 McCollum, however,
responded by holding hearings on May 27, 1999, on "gun violence and the
enforcement of the federal firearm laws."' 37 There, in addition to calling for
tougher juvenile sanctions, he called attention to the "significant drop-off' in
federal gun prosecutions.3 8 The Administration's witnesses, Deputy Attorney
General Eric H. Holder, Jr. and Treasury Under Secretary (Enforcement) James E.
Johnson, replied by asserting that its "strategy of increased collaboration among
federal, state, and local law enforcement" had resulted in a sharp rise in the
"combined number of federal and state firearms convictions" since 1992, and a
twenty-five percent increase in the number offederal cases in which an offender
received five or more years imprisonment.' 39 And they focused on the breadth of
ATF's "overall enforcement strategy": ATF "attacks armed violent crime through
direct intervention, arresting criminals who misuse firearms"; "attacks violent
crime on the supply side, by identifying individuals who illegally supply firearms
to criminals and juveniles," and "seeks to forestall criminal diversion from the
legal to the illegal market through regulatory enforcement measures." 4 After
making the by-now obligatory references to the successes in Boston and
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. § 803.
See id. § 804.
See id. § 805.
Frank Bruni, House Democrats Press Early Vote on FirearmsBill, N.Y.

TIMES, May 22, 1999, at Al.
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COMM. (visited June 2, 2000) <www.house.gov/judiciary/mccoO527.htm>
(statement of Crime Subcomm. Chairman Bill McCollum).
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Richmond (described at length in accompanying statements), the Administration's
testimony noted that its strategy was based on the fact that "'thevast majority of
the violent crime in our country falls within the jurisdiction of state and local
governments."'' "Indeed," they warned:
[A]ny effort that does not consider the appropriate roles of the
respective levels of government runs the risk of shifting cases that
can be handled effectively at the local and state level to the federal
level, with significant opportunity and financial costs. Substantial
opportunity costs are incurred when federal resources that could be
used to combat uniquely federal crimes-like interstate gun
trafficking-are used instead on cases42 that could be handled
effectively by state and local authorities.
Among the witnesses who followed was the NRA's LaPierre, who
faulted the Justice Department for claiming that federal gun laws "are for the
states to enforce" and reiterated his organization's support for Project Exile."
On June 18, 1999, fresh from passing a tough juvenile justice bill the day
before (a bill that included one provision that allowed the Ten Commandments to
be displayed in public settings and another that criticized the entertainment media
for gratuitous violence), the House rejected an already weakened package of the
Clinton Administration's regulatory proposals, including the gun-show
background check provision.'" No action was taken on it, though. The passage of
the juvenile justice provision left room for a House-Senate conference to consider
regulatory measures, but, as summer approached, the action moved from Capital
Hill to the hustings."
Exile remained on center stage, however-especially after Governor
George W. Bush went to Richmond on June 22 to "embrace" the program and tell
how it should be adopted nationwide.'" And the venue for Vice President Gore's
response a few weeks later? Readers who have gotten into the spirit of the debate
141.
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should be able to figure it out. Surrounded by Boston police officers, Gore called
for gun control measures, like photo licenses, that "[went] beyond anything
President Clinton has proposed."' 47 But he stayed with the Administration's theme
of discretionary federal enforcement, supporting longer sentences for gun crimes
and pledging "to work with states that want to stop plea bargaining on crimes
committed with guns.' 48
When Congress returned from recess, its leaders made little progress in
reconciling House and Senate gun legislation. Republicans kept the spotlight on
Exile though. In the Senate, Judiciary Chairman Hatch's staff released a report
"for parents, prosecutors, and policy makers" that (once again) criticized the
Clinton Administration for the decline in federal firearms prosecutions and took
credit for any recent improvement: "When Congress presented evidence of the
successes of Project Triggerlock and Project Exile, the Administration, to its
credit, finally and slowly began to reverse course."' 49 Continuing a Republican

theme, the report also took the Administration to task for prosecuting only one of
the "approximately 100,000" instances in which a convicted felon or otherwise
disqualified person had tried to buy a firearm but had been turned down."' 0
Meanwhile the House Government Reform Subcommittee, chaired by
Congressman Dan Burton (R-Ind.) heard testimony from Charlton Heston,
celebrating the "fearless prosecutors" in Richmond who "employed the awesome
simplicity of enforcing existing federal gun law" in Project Exile and thereby
saved lives.' 5'
Democrats had their own uses for "Exile" during the late summer and fall
of 1999. In Colorado, the U.S. Attorney, subtly (or maybe not so subtly) borrowed
the name for a program in Denver and Colorado Springs more in keeping with the
Administration's gun policy. In this "Project Exile," federal gun prosecutions
increased, but state prosecutions were expected to play an equal part.'52 In upstate
New York, Senator Schumer announced that he had obtained funding for Exiles in
Buffalo and Rochester, but, in doing so, noted that some of the money would be
"used to intensify federal records checks on guns that wind up in the hands of
criminals and surveillance efforts."' 53 Moreover, in Rochester, teams of state and
federal prosecutors jointly "screen[ed] every gun case and decide[d] which court,
147.
Melinda Henneberger, Gore Unveils Crime-FightingPlan, From Right and
Left, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at AIO.
148.
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police and prosecutors"); U.S. Attorney's Office, D. Colo., Project Exile Overview, (visited
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state or federal, would result in a more likely conviction and longer sentence.""
And in Buffalo, the U.S. Attorney and local district attorney voiced hopes that the
"venture [would] lead to more pretrial pleas and longer sentences for gun cases
prosecuted in the state courts."'5 5
"Gridlock" on gun legislation continued into the new year,'5 enhancing
the issue's allure as a focal point for public debate (or, the cynics might say,
campaign rhetoric). On January 18, 2000, President Clinton announced his
"National Gun Enforcement Initiative""' (in Boston, of course, not Richmond).
There was nothing radically new here, but the initiative marked a more concerted
effort to use street-crime enforcement programs as a vehicle for selling a far
broader firearms strategy, including a call for 500 new ATF agents and inspectors
to "help us crack down on violent gun criminals, illegal gun traffickers, and badapple dealers."'5 8 The President mentioned Richmond once, but only in passing,
and coupled with a reference to Boston, when he spoke of grants for anti-violence
media campaigns.' 59
The Clinton Administration's aggressive championing of ATF's broader
mission continued in February 2000, with the President himself announcing a new
program to crack down on corrupt gun dealers.'" Having been criticized by
Congress for seeking new legislation instead of enforcing existing gun laws, the
Administration, according to presidential domestic policy advisor Bruce Reed,
was "giving Congress a chance to put its money where its mouth is." 6t ATF, for
its part, highlighted its regulatory enforcement programs by simultaneously
issuing a statistics-packed report on Commerce in Firearmsin the United States.1'2
And when, in March, Treasury Under Secretary Johnson formally presented the
Administration's budget requests, he gracefully put Exile to work. Treasury
sought funding for 600 ATF agents, inspectors and "other" personnel,
to support local intensive prosecution projects like Project Ceasefire
in Boston and Project Exile in Richmond. These local strategic
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projects encompass investigations of armed criminals and illegal
traffickers, and inspections of firearms dealers that are sources of

illegally attempting to acquire
firearms to criminals, as well as those
63
or illegally possessing firearms.'
A few days later, when asked what the White House thought about
Project Exile, the President's press secretary kept on message, avowing the
Administration's support for Exile and Ceasefire in Boston and touting
' its record
for providing such innovative programs with "government resources."' "
The task the House Republicans now faced was somewhat harder than
before: It was not enough simply to tout Exile-like programs as a substitute for
new gun legislation, 65 since the Administration was now using Exile's success as
an argument for increasing ATF's budget. Congressman McCollum, backed by the
House Republican leadership, had a ready answer, however: a bill, introduced
March 22, that focused attention on the rigors of existing federal firearms laws but
that steered funding for enforcement programs to state enforcers (not ATF). This
was H.R. 4051, "Project Exile: The Safe Streets and Neighborhood Act of
2000,"'6 which provided for one hundred million dollars in block grants over five
years to states that enacted firearms sentencing laws with five-year mandatory
terms for use of a gun during a violent felony or serious drug crime and/or for
possession of a firearm by a predicate felon. 67 A state without such laws could
also obtain grant money by entering into "an equivalent federal prosecution
agreement" that committed the state to refer such cases to federal prosecuting
authorities. 6 No monies were specifically provided to fund the federal
enforcement efforts that would be spurred by the bill.' 69 Hearings on the
legislation, which Chairman McCollum held soon after, gave the Republican
163.
Press Release, Statement of Under Secretary for Enforcement James E.
Johnson, Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, House Comm.
On Appropriations (Mar. 9, 2000) <wwwv.treas.gov/press/releases/ps448.htm>.
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14/8.text.l>.
165.
This is not to say that Republicans did not continue to do so. Rep. Robert
Ehrlich (R-Md.) told constituents on February 16, 2000, that Maryland would do better to

adopt "a complete Exile type program," instead of the local U.S. Attorney's "weaker
program of selective enforcement." He then noted:
Unfortunately, the political establishment in Maryland, led by the
Attorney General [J. Joseph Curran, Jr.], seeks to push more gun control
during a time the newspapers are full of stories re how we are unable to
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with the Curran-[Maryland Governor Parris N.] Glendening-[Lt.
Governor Kathleen Kennedy] Townsend mind set on gun control, it does
not enhance our ability to implement programs that work-like Exile.
Project Exile: Rep. Robert Ehrlich (R-Md.), Washingtonpost.com:Live Online-OnPolitics
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Governor of Virginia, James Gilmore 11, a chance to tell how, in July 1999, his
state had instituted "Virginia Exile."'" By passing sentencing and bail statutes
similar to the federal provisions, this program had "enhance[d] the sovereignty of
the state in prosecuting gun crimes, and reliev[ed] it of the need to refer cases to
federal courts."'' A representative of Texas' Attorney General also appeared and
told of "Texas Exile."'" Texas did not have gun laws like those proposed in
McCollum's bill, but it was "considering the option" and, in any event, would be
eligible for funding because it had entered into a "cooperative agreement with all
four U.S. Attorneys to prosecute those criminals under federal law where
appropriate."' "
It was the Texas approach that most troubled the Justice Department's
witness at McCollum's hearings, U.S. Attorney Walter Holton, from the Middle
District of North Carolina. 74 His mere presence emphasizing the decentralized
nature of the Department's own strategy (and/or the strained relations between the
Department and Congress), Holton asserted that "[c]reating incentives that could
result in the indiscriminate federalization of specific types of gun crimes might

significantly hamper the ability of state, local, and federal prosecutors to combat
the violent crime problem in their own communities most effectively."'" He also
urged Congress "not to create incentives that might lead to wholesale federal
adoption of local gun prosecutions, which would significantly hinder the ability of
federal authorities to enforce the other important federal laws and overwhelm the
federal courts."'76
Congressional Democrats had an even more immediate response to
McCollum's "Exile" bill in their ENFORCE Act."n Following through on the
Administration's proposals, the bill provided for 600 new ATF agents and
inspectors, 114 new federal prosecutors to bring federal gun cases, grants for local
prosecutors, and also would have given ATF increased authority to inspect
licensed firearms dealers, established a forensic ballistics test-firing program, and
funded "smart gun technology."' 78 Lest the point be missed, Democrats posed the
measure as their challenge to the NRA's calls for more enforcement.'9
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House Republicans had the votes, though. After their leadership raced the
bill to the floor in only two weeks-to have it ready before the anniversary of the
Columbine High School shootings-it passed on April 11, 358 to 60.80 Senator
Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) introduced an identical bill in the Senate immediately
thereafter,' giving Republican Senators another opportunity to tout the virtues of
"this basic crime-fighting approach" (as opposed to the Clinton Administration's
proposed regulatory measures)."s
For the Clinton Administration and its allies, the legislative setback
provided yet another occasion to proclaim the need for a more comprehensive
strategy. The day of the vote, President Clinton went to Annapolis, Maryland, to
mark that state's passage of a law mandating built-in safety locks on handguns.'83
Later, at the end of June, Treasury Secretary Summers and other officials
promoted wide coverage of an ATF report on gun trafficking. 84 The report,
Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers,
trumpeted ATF's success in more than 1500 ATF investigations and stressed the
need for even more enforcement activity in this area.' "Gun traffickers," it
avowed, "play a critical and deadly role in the chain of violence."'8 6 At the same
time, the report called attention to the inadequacies of the current regulatory
scheme, particularly
for gun show sales and of the penalties for violation of
87
existing laws.
Clinton Administration allies also continued to push for a greater state
role in gun enforcement. In May, some House Democrats introduced the
"Community Gun Prosecutor Act of 2000," which would have designated 150
million dollars for state and local prosecutors to bring state gun cases.'88 If the
Republicans thought existing gun laws were sufficient, one sponsor challenged,
why not fund the enforcement of the state laws (as well as the federal ones) on the
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books. "' Indeed, when Senator Schumer went to Buffalo on July I1 to announce
new funding for that city's Exile, the Niagara County District Attorney
"emphasized that his office has prosecuted 'scores and scores' of cases" under the
program's guidelines.' 90
But few could rival the President in his effort to put states out in front
(and to make up for lost time on the race to capture "Exile"). At a June 2000 press
conference, Clinton noted that a House appropriations committee was "on the
verge" of rejecting his Administration's "proposal for the largest gun enforcement
initiative in history" and chided Republicans:
Incomprehensible though it may be, their bill fails to provide any
funding at all to hire 1000 new state and local gun prosecutors to
help take gun criminals out of our communities and put them behind
bars. It undermines our efforts to replicate the success of
Richmond's Project Exile, another key initiative the Republicans
have alvays said they support And it fails to provide funding to
expand research development of smart gun technology.
I ask the Republican leadership to reverse the current
course, to live up to the rhetoric, to fully fund the national gun
enforcement initiative.' 9'
During the summer, each side (to its credit) enshrined its position on
these issues in its platform. The Republicans, though "oppos[ing] federal licensing
of law-abiding gun owners and national gun registration as a violation of the
Second Amendment and an invasion of privacy of honest citizens," promised,
"[t]hrough programs like Project Exile," to "hold criminals individually
accountable for their actions by strong enforcement of federal and state firearm
laws."' 92 The Democrats, taking credit for the twenty-two percent increase in
"federal, state and local gun crime prosecution" since 1992, called for "mandatory
child safety locks," photo license IDs, and "a full background check and gun
safety test" for purchasers. 3 They went on to "support more federal gun
prosecutors, ATF agents and inspectors and giving states and communities another
10,000 prosecutors to fight gun crime.""
In part because neither Governor Bush nor Vice President Gore found it
advantageous to press their positions, and in part because no major gun tragedies
required them to do so, gun control rhetoric ended up being rather muted in post-
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convention campaigning. 95 With Governor Bush's victory, however, the battle
over Exile, and over gun policy generally, promises to resume. In its final days,
the Clinton Administration did what it could to preserve its integrated supply-side
and demand-side strategy. In late December 2000, Clinton signed budget
legislation that provided the nearly 200 million dollars that he had sought in his
Gun Enforcement Initiative to fund 500 ATF agents and inspectors and more than
600 federal, state, and local prosecutors. 9 6 And in the very last days of the Clinton
Administration, the Treasury and Justice Departments issued their "National
Integrated Firearms Violence Reduction Strategy,"'" which celebrated the
comprehensive nature of the Administration's gun policies and the diversity of
approaches to gun violence that had been taken in federal districts across the
nation. While more muted than some of the Clinton Administration's other final
salvos, the report put down clear markers, from which retrogression could more
easily be measured.
Had Gore become President, Clinton's budget victories might well have
reduced the effect of Exile politics upon overall federal policy, giving ATF
resources to pursue both supply-side cases and violent use and possession cases.
But, of course, had Gore become President, there might not have been such budget
victories. In any event, the election of George W. Bush, and his selection of
another leading Exile supporter, John Ashcroft,' as Attorney General, vastly
raises the likelihood that Exile-type programs will become the primary focus of
federal gun enforcement efforts' and that most of the newly obtained federal
resources will be deployed in this direction."'
195.
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I. ASSESSING EXILE
Is Project Exile a good idea? In some ways, this is an easy question.
People can quarrel over the value of the war on drugs, over what business
practices should be deemed fraud, even over whether perjury in a civil case should
be pursued criminally. But there is near unanimity that gun-toting drug traffickers
or robbers ought to be prosecuted, and substantial agreement that a convicted felon
should face charges for possessing a firearm. Indeed, it is this consensus that has

made Exile seem one of the few free spaces in the complicated "game" of gun
control politics.
In other ways, Project Exile raises some extremely difficult policy
questions. Exile's targets undoubtedly should be charged. But why federally?
When Richmond police officers arrest an armed drug dealer or robber, or find that
the person they've just frisked has both a gun and a prior felony conviction, why
can't they just take the case to the Commonwealth's Attorney? This is the issue
that has attracted so much attention in recent yearsP One need not invoke
constitutional absolutes to make a good case for leaving state and local authorities
primarily responsible for street crime. 20 3 To be sure, federal enforcers may have a
more powerful arsenal: tougher bail statutes, higher effective sentences, fewer
cases per prosecutor, etc. But, as many opponents of "over-federalization" have
pointed out, federal intervention in this area may allow state and local authorities
to dodge their responsibilities. 2
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Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 394-97 (1997); Richman, supra note 56, at 783-84;
Ben Tinsley, ProgramPunishesFirearms Offenders; ProsecutorSet on Getting Criminals
More Jail Time, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Nov. 23, 2000, at Al (commenting on Exile, a

Wise County, Texas, district attorney noted: "Your state government is hiring prosecutors
to take cases away from the local elected district attorneys and route them to the federal
prosecutors and federal judges who do not answer to the voters. This should scae you to

death.").
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Is this what happened in Richmond? It's hard to say. After all, it did not
take very long for Virginia to change its bail laws, increase its sentences, and
0

commit significant police and prosecutorial resources to Exile-type cases. s

Perhaps state officials might have acted earlier, if left to their own devices, or,
alternatively, have been fittingly faulted for inaction in the face of Richmond's
devastating homicide rate. But one can equally argue that the U.S. Attorney's
Office simply piloted a project whose success catalyzed state processes-not a
particularly egregious role for the federal government to play. In the face of a
spiraling homicide rate that threatened the very fabric of a hard-pressed
community, federal officials, lacking any direct political accountability but still
tied to local power structures,"0 6 simply drew on the strategic reserve that
discretionary enforcement has traditionally allowed them to amass.2 As soon as
possible, they shifted responsibility for the program to the state. One can also
argue that regardless of the moral hazard that federal intervention creates for state
and local enforcers, the apportioning of federal versus state responsibilities should
not be done on the backs of a besieged citizenry (particularly when they are urban
residents of a primarily suburban or rural state).
The policy conundrum is not merely one about the federal-state divide,
either. Even if one assumes
that Project Exile is an appropriate exercise in
"cooperative federalism,""2 8 it still raises hard questions about federal firearms
enforcement policy. Programmatic commitments always have opportunity costs,
both in political attention and in enforcement resources. And once one gets by the
code words, the politics of Exile have really been about the project's negative
implications. The paeans to Exile are not just to the idea of locking up gun-toting
criminals, but to the idea that such a strategy should be the primary (even
exclusive) means by which federal enforcers target violent crime, as opposed to,
say, new legislation affecting gun shows, requiring safety locks, or other
regulatory measures.
The appeal of Exile-type programs for many of their loudest champions
is probably not limited to the belief that calls for enforcing existing laws can
provide an acceptable political alternative to passing new ones. Equally important
is the effect that such programs have on ATF's ability to enforce existing laws
against targets other than street-level criminals. As of 1998, ATF had only 1779
criminal investigators, fourteen percent fewer than the agency had in 1992, when
it had

2072

.2t9 This decline is symptomatic of ATF's political weakness. Saddled

with a portfolio that includes none of the sacred cows (like national security or
presidential protection) that sister agencies like the FBI and Secret Service glory
in, charged with enforcing gun and alcohol laws that many Americans consider a
205.
206.
207.

See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See Richman, supranote 56, at 785.
See Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically:How FederalProsecutorsCan
Reduce Violent Crime, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (1999).
208.
See Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting
Successive Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIm. L. I

(1992); Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multifurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement andDoubleJeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1159 (1995).
209.
See New Findingson A TF CriminalEnforcement,supra note 116.
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threat to their very way of life, and housed in a Cabinet department in which law
enforcement concerns are inevitably secondary, ATF has always come up short in
the budgetary process 0t Indeed, the agency may owe its continued existence to
this intended weakness. Although opponents of gun regulation and proponents of
government streamlining have regularly called for its elimination,2 ' ATF has
survived, in large part because opponents of its enforcement work have feared
that, at its demise, such functions would be transferred to a less vulnerable

agency

12

ATF has, from time to time, chafed at the operational restraints with
which it has been bound by statute and budget. Although (despite some reports),
there is no reason to believe that it was planned as some sort of publicity stunt, the
February 28, 1993, raid on the Branch Davidian compound was a quite selfconscious demonstration of the agency's ability to mount a large-scale tactical
operation and of its interest in firearms violations by separatist groups? The
debacle at Waco, of course, only increased the agency's political vulnerability
thereafter.
For the most part, ATF has adapted to its political environment. And one
of its principal adaptive mechanisms has been its readiness to work with state and
local enforcers in combating street crime." 4 By providing firearms tracing and
ballistics as well as street-level support to local enforcers in this area, ATF (at least
until recently) could simultaneously win valuable allies and stay away from the
trafficking cases most likely to arouse legislative ire.21 S This strategy explains the
agency's eagerness (particularly under Republican Administrations) to embrace
the Justice Department's Triggerlock and its own Project Achilles.? 6
Against this backdrop, the celebration of Project Exile by the NRA and
many opponents of the Clinton Administration must be read as an effort to
encourage, even force, the agency to continue or expand its focus on street
210.
See Wendy L. Martinek, et al., Jackboots or Lace Panties? The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,in THE CHANGIiNG POLITIcS OF GUN CONTROL 17, 24-25
(John M. Bruce & Clyde Wilcox eds., 1998).
211.
See Vice President Albert Gore's National Performance Review, Cutting
Back to Basics, at 21-22 (Sept. 1993), availableat <wwv.npr.govllibrarylnprrptlredtpe931
2272.html> (proposing that ATF's law enforcement functions be transferred to the FBI);
Helen Dewar, Treasury's FirearmsBureau Is Targetedfor Elimination,WAsH. POST, Sept.
19, 1981, at Al; Richman, supra note 56, at 796.
212.
See VizzARD, supra note 60, at 81; Richman, supranote 56, at 796.
213.
See VizzARD, supra note 60, at 154-88; Report of the Dep't of Treasury on
the Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco, andFirearmsInvestigation of Vernon Wayne Howell, also
known as David Koresh (Sept. 1993), available at <http.//vww.constitution.org/
waco/treadstrpt_g/txt>.
214.
See VZZARD, supra note 60, at 89; see also Geller & Morris, supra note 60,
at 247 n.8 (noting ATF's reputation in this regard among local police); Messagefrom ATF
DirectorJohn W. Magaw, in 1996 HIGHLIGHTs OFTHE BuRFAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND
FRARMS 1 (1997) ("Our success in investigating crimes has traditionally been built on a
partnership with state and local police.").
215.
See Fox Butterfield, Limits on Power and Zeal HamperFirearmsAgency,
N.Y. TmEs, July 22, 1999, at Al.
216.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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violence. The unstated corollary of this encouragement, given ATF's limited
resources, is to discourage the agency from targeting gun dealers and pursuing
firearms cases against those whose only criminality lay in the "technicalities" of
the firearms laws. This strategy also appears to lie behind Republican demands
that ATF and the Justice Department commit more resources to pursuing
convicted felons who have attempted unsuccessfully to purchase a firearm.
An agency as politically vulnerable as ATF can be quite susceptible to
legislative encouragement. Even the FBI has been known to heed such signals." 7
(Indeed, its present power may in part be a tribute to the skill with which the FBI
has responded to legislative pressure.) The elegance of the Project Exile approach
for advocates of minimalist gun regulation, however, is that it does not rely simply
on legislative fiat or suasion. The chief challenge Congress faces when trying to
set enforcement priorities (or delegate authority in any area) is how to monitor
agency compliance."' This is particularly true in the criminal area, where agency
operations are often shrouded in secrecy, where there are traditions of legislative
non-interference, and where complaints are rarely heard when cases are not
brought." 9 Exile provides the perfect monitoring mechanism in the form of state
and local authorities. At least under the Richmond version of Exile, state and local
police generate the cases and consequently have a good sense of whether federal
authorities are following through on their commitment to pursue them. And given
that a state has a strong and independent motive to shunt enforcement costs over to
the federal government,'" one would expect that its officials would be quick to
complain to their local representatives if the feds reneged.
This all explains the delicate dance that ATF officials have had to
perform while Exile is under scrutiny. Positive coverage of agency operations has
been all too rare in recent years, and the temptation to bask in favorable coverage
from traditionally hostile or unsympathetic comers has surely been great. But were
Project Exile to be used as a template for nationwide anti-violence programs, the
agency's ability to pursue large aspects of what it believes to be its core mission
would be severely limited.

217.
See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARcoTIcs
AGENTS 166 (1978).
218.
See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory:
The Tug of War overAdministrativeAgencies, 80 Geo. L.J. 671, 671-72 (1992).
219.
See Richman, supra note 56, at 776-78.

220.
United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1999). The
judges noted:
The Federal Bureau of Prisons leases space in the Northern Neck
Regional Jail from the Commonwealth of Virginia to incarcerate Project
Exile defendants prior to trial. Thus the Commonwealth's prisons benefit
not only from a lower occupancy rate once defendants are convicted
under Project Exile and are incarcerated in a federal facility, but also by
generating revenue for housing defendants while they await trial in the
federal system. This is another cost borne by federal taxpayers, the
benefit of which inures exclusively to residents of the Commonwealth.
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The Clinton Administration and pro-control legislators like Senator
Schumer and Representative McCarthy have shared these concerns. The constant
references to "Boston" instead of, or at least in addition to, "Richmond"; the focus
on state, not just federal, gun crime prosecutions; the efforts to highlight ATF's
gun trafficking and rogue dealer prosecutions-the theme running through all of
these is that federal firearms enforcement must address the supply as well as the
demand side, and that ATF must be allowed to strategically use its limited
resources, special expertise, and unique national scope to work both sides of the
market."2 The goals have been both to promote ATF's pursuit of supply-side
cases, and (in the same vein) to prevent the wholesale legislative commitment of
ATF assets to street-level possession and use cases. And if ATF had to be saddled
with nationwide Exile-type programs, the agency needed more manpower. Hence
the 2000 budget request, which (in brilliant judo fashion) used such programs to
justify a massive expansion of the beleagured agency.
It would thus be a mistake to read the Democratic calls for increased state
and local firearms enforcement activity simply as representing some grand
commitment to principles of federalism and state responsibility. The calls also
arise out of a recognition that, absent such local efforts, the pressure on federal
authorities to divert resources to the most heinous criminals-the violent, armed
felons-would be impossible to resist and would leave the Administration in
control of fewer resources available for use in less localized trafficking cases 22
Or, to put it somewhat differently, there would be fewer federal resources for
Washington to deploy against targets that only Washington had the means (and
possibly the inclination) to pursue.
Once one recognizes the likely, and intended, consequences of the
Republican efforts to establish Exile nationwide, the question becomes whether
this is good firearms policy. Yet at this crucial juncture in my story I have the least
to say. The extent to which such end-use enforcement programs should dominate
our national anti-violence strategy is of course the critical issue in the gun debate-

an issue over which the conflict often seems as much over expressive normsm as

221.

Support for the Administration's position has also come from local officials

who support a supply-side gun strategy. See Firearm Prosecutions,supra note 6, at 58
(statement of John F. Timoney, Philadelphia Police Commissioner). Timoney stated:
It is important and appropriate that the federal government plays a role

in the fight against gun violence. It is well recognized that there is an
unmistakable interstate nature to gun trafficking and gun violence. Gun
supply cannot be controlled in an individual state solely by legislation in
that state....States with lenient gun purchase laws thus become the
source for illegal guns used in states that have tried to limit guns through
strong legislation.

Id.
222.
See generally U.S BUREAu OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMs,
FOLLOWING ThE GUN (2000).
223.
See Dan M. Kahan, Is Gun Control Illiberal (unpublished manuscript 2001)
(on file with Author); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HArrV. L.
REV. 413,451-62 (1999).
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over empirical evidence .1 4 And I will restrict myself to the understatement that
this is a point on which reasonable minds differ.
IV. EXILE POLITICS AND THE CONTROL OF FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT ASSETS
Not taking a position on the broad firearms policy debate does not
preclude one from exploring and critiquing the implications of Exile politics for
the federal enforcement bureaucracy. On this score, the focus of the analysis is
less on the need for Exile-type programs than on the role Congress has or should
play in mandating them.
The story of federal criminal legislation in the twentieth century has been
one of steady encroachment into areas that once were the exclusive province of
state and local enforcers.225 And the pace has only increased in recent years,
notwithstanding strong criticism of this "over-federalization" trend by numerous
judges and scholars. 6 Yet while Congress has been quite aggressive in passing
227
statutes that ignore, or even eliminate, traditional enforcement boundaries,
legislators have been remarkably passive in dictating the actual terms of
interaction between federal enforcers and state and local authorities. Congress, for
example, may have been quick to pass federal cajacking legislation in the wake of
a widely publicized Maryland case in which an auto-theft victim was dragged to
her death,"s but, to the extent it had any purpose other than an expression of
federal outrage, the statute was more a grant of authority than a demand for federal
jurisdiction. It certainly did not preempt local police from pursuing such crimes,
and neither required, nor even expected, that federal agencies would take the bulk
of such cases.
This is not to say that Congress has played a minimal role in structuring
the boundaries between federal enforcers and their state and local counterparts,

The principal constraint on federal intervention-the minuscule size of the
enforcement bureaucracy relative to the number of crimes that potentially could be
charged federally-is undoubtedly a reflection of Congress's belief that the
primary responsibility for fighting crime, particularly street crime, remains with
the States. 9 Legislators also bring their influence to bear on federal enforcement
224.
See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS
(2000); KLECK, supra note 20; JOHN R. LOT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME:
UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000); JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL.,
UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1983); James B. Jacobs &
Kimberly Potter, Keeping Guns out of the Wrong Hands, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93
(1995).
225.
See Richnan, supra note 59, at 83-91; see also supra note 202 and sources
cited within.
226.
See Richman, supra note 59, at 89-91.
227.
The high-water mark of this trend may have been Senator D'Amato's
unsuccessful effort to make just about any crime committed with a gun into a federal
offense. See Naftali Bendavid, Reading Crime Bill's Fine Print; Overlooked Amendments
Draw FireAs Unconstitutional,Overly Harsh,LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at 1.
228.
Richman, supra note 56, at 773; see also 18 U.S.C § 2119 (1994).
229.
Richman, supra note 59, at 91-92.
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policy in their respective districts by exercising substantial control over the
selection of U.S. Attorneys.o
Outside of setting these structural parameters, however, Congress has
generally let federal enforcers negotiate explicit or tacit understandings with their
counterparts about divisions of labor 3 Each element of the federal apparatus has
thus played a part in setting the federal agenda. Administrations have had national
priorities, with Triggerlock being a prime example. 2 So have enforcement
agencies, though, as in the case of Achilles, agency initiatives usually have been
synchronized with Administration policy. But the decentralization of federal
prosecutorial authority has given U.S. Attorneys considerable discretion in
implementing these priorities, and considerable ability to pursue initiatives of their
own-like Rudolph Giuliani's "Federal Day '3 or the Eastern District of
Virginia's Project Exile.? 4
There are real advantages to letting federal, state, and local enforcers in
each district negotiate the boundaries of their interaction without legislative
interference. Without the formality of statutes, the modus vivendi within a district
can respond to changing local conditions, and the expertise of those on the
scene? 5 The potential for friction is of course present, and turf wars do occur. But
"[g]iven the degree of statutory overlap between the state and federal systems, and
the absence of any formal division of authority, [ what is remarkable is not the
occurrence of such disputes but their relative infrequency.""u At the end of the
day, federal enforcers are well aware that only local authorities can provide the
comer-by-corner informational network needed to pursue the kinds of crime for
which local police have always been responsible? 3 And they will have to
cooperate with the locals to gain access to this resource.
Yet there are also real disadvantages. For one thing, "a system of lowvisibility negotiated boundaries diminishes the accountability of the system's
actors. " ' s State and local officials can circumvent their jurisdictions' evidentiary
rules, sentencing provisions, or forfeiture procedures by handing cases over to
federal authorities. Local police can avoid the political controls ordinarily imposed
by their need to take cases to locally elected prosecutors. State legislators can
avoid being held responsible for the inadequacies of their enactments. U.S.
Attorneys, for their part, can gain even more independence from Washington (and
thus diminish their political accountability) by relying on state and local enforcers
230.
Id at 92-93.
231.
Id at 91-96.
232.
See supra Part II.A.
233.
See United States v. Aguilar, 779 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1985) (complaining
that program converted "garden-variety state law drug offenses into federal offenses"); see
also Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales ofJusticeoff Balance,
N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 29, 1989, A18.
234.
See Richman,supra note 59, at 94-95.
235.
Id. at 95.

236.

Id at 96.

237.
Id. at 93.
238.
Id. at 97; see also John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the
FederalizationofLocal Crime, 72 TEIPLE L. REV. 673, 702-07 (1999).
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instead of highly centralized federal enforcement agencies. U.S. Attorneys and
their assistants
may self-deal by selecting those cases that best further their
9
careers.2
How then does one strike the appropriate balance between these
advantages and disadvantages? Although many, including a majority of the
Supreme Court,2 41 think otherwise, it is futile and unnecessary to look for some a
priori constitutional divide that, for example, puts street crime outside federal
bounds.24' The best we can do is to increase transparency and accountability.
These two values are well served by increasing the legislative involvement in linedrawing, encouraging Congress not merely to authorize federal enforcement
activity but also to play a bigger role in setting enforcement priorities in this
sensitive area.
Without taking a position on the wisdom of the particular policies
embodied in the Republican proposals to export Project Exile nationwide, one can
thus make good arguments for more congressional involvement in the deployment
of federal enforcement assets in areas of traditional state and local authority.2 4 On
the other hand, the politics of Exile also highlight the institutional costs of
extensive legislative involvement in these matters.
Direct political accountability is not an unalloyed good in law
enforcement. With primary responsibility for public safety within clear
geographically defined bounds, local authorities will often be hard pressed to save
up resources for strategic use. Undoubtedly some strategic deployment will be
possible, and local officials often trumpet the importance of one program or
another. But imagine the consequences if a police force stopped patrolling one
neighborhood so as to better focus on crime in another. Yet this is precisely what
federal enforcers-with the "luxury" of resources so plainly inadequate for
addressing every crime on their "beat"--regularly do.243 At its best, the federal
239.
See Richman, supra note 59, at 102. For some empirical support of this
point, see Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do ProsecutorsMaximize? An Analysis of the
Federalizationof Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & EcON. RV. 259, 272-73 (2000). The value of
this study, however, is diminished by its failure to recognize the critical role that federal
enforcement agencies play in case selection.
240.
See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (invalidating the
Violence Against Women Act's tort remedy); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990).
241.
So long as street crime is economically motivated, or involves the use a
weapon, like a gun, that invariably will have moved at some time in interstate commerce,
even Morrison'srestrictive reading of the Commerce Clause powers gives Congress ample
authority to act in this area. See United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2001)
(rejecting post-Monison constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the felon-inpossession statute).
242.
See Richman, supra note 59, at 101-03.
243.
Richman, supra note 56, at 765-66. When OMB proposed the elimination of
over 550 ATF positions, with the savings to go to local and state police grants, one editorial
condemned the "absurdity":
Rookie cops can't replace veteran federal firearns agents. They can't
conduct interstate gun trafficking investigations. They don't have access
to gun dealer records and international databanks. And they can't spend
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enforcement bureaucracy thus complements state and local systems nicely by
providing the strategic reserve that local officials do not ostensibly control (and
therefore lack political responsibility for), but that they can draw on when
significant investigative (or adjudicative) investments are needed. 2"
The keys to this system, though, are discretionary gatekeeping by federal
officials and the delicate balance between local and national federal authority.
Against sometimes parochial local needs, a U.S. Attorney must consider broader
national priorities, usually conveyed by Main Justice or expressed by the referrals
of highly centralized enforcement agencies (of which the FBI is the best, because
most centralized, example).245 One need not subscribe to an Administration's
particular national priorities to see how the dynamic equilibrium between local
and national demands is perhaps the best guarantee that the strategic federal
reserve will not quickly be dissipated into the bottomless pit of local needs.
Viewed from this perspective, legislative efforts to implement Exile
nationwide-by directing pressuring federal enforcers to adopt such programs and
encouraging state authorities to extract commitments from U.S. Attorneys to this
end-are a troubling challenge to the notion of the federal government as a
strategic resource. In the current political climate, in which politicians at the
national level from both parties strive to outdo one another in targeting violence, it
is inevitable (however regrettable to the Supreme Court and others) that federal
enforcers will take cases that traditionally fell within the province of state and
local governments. What Exile's champions would do, however, is to make U.S.
Attorneys' Offices the prosecutors of first resort in a broad range of these cases
and to do so in a way that will be hard to reverse. As a technical matter, an Office
would not be obliged to commit itself to an Exile-type arrangement. But a U.S.
Attorney would be hard pressed to resist the calls of local officials for such a
program, especially where violence was at a high level and federal grants
proffered. Given that a critical source of her autonomy lies in the counterbalance
that her ties to local officials and her district's congressional delegation provides
to Washington's authority, the combination of these two forces would be potent."

as much time tracking violent offenders because of local priorities from
traffic enforcement to burglaries.
Editorial, Why Pass Gun Lavs, Then Firethe Lav Enforcers, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 1994,
atA10.
244.
Explaining the appeal of Exile, Erie County (N.Y.) District Attorney Frank
J,. Clark (a former federal prosecutor) noted: '.It gives us more flexibility....It brings in the
FBI, ATF, more resources....Let's face it...[t]he feds need the grist for the mill. We're the
grist. They need the street level crimes. They provide the resources, the extra jurisdiction."'
Beebe, supra note 154, at IA.
245.
Richman, supranote 59, at 94-95.
246.
Even without the Republican legislation, calls by local officials for Exiletype federal intervention can be quite forceful. See, e.g., Daryl NerI, Project Exile Aims to
Bring Tough Gun Crime Sentences; FederalProsecutors Come in to City P/hen The Are
Called, Often Resulting in Stiffer Penalties,THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), July 18,
2000, at B3 (describing efforts of City Council's Public Safety Committee Chairman to
bring Exile to Allentown); Larry Alexander, Mendoza Pushes Project Cease Fire;
Councilman Will Make Presentationsto Local, State, Federal Oficials, INTELGENCER J.
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Anyone who doubts this potency only need look at the parade of new Exile-type
programs during the Summer of 2000, since the passage of the Republican Exile
legislation (even in the absence of an actual statute).247 And the pressure on U.S.
Attorneys, even in the absence of legislation, will only increase now that two of
Exile's biggest boosters have become President and Attorney General.24
This is not to say that state and local authorities will always demand such
a program. Just as state regulatory minimalists have led the cheers for Exile, so
might a state's leadership find Exile somewhat incompatible with (or at least not a

desirable part of) an activist regulatory program.249 Exile politics in Maryland are
instructive. There, where Governor Parris N. Glendening and Lieutenant Governor
Kathleen Kennedy Townsend won congratulations from President Clinton in April
2000 for the passage of internal safety-lock legislation, and have vigorously

supported broad regulatory measures,25 ° and where city officials presided over a
federally funded project of "community-based anticrime strategies,"' ' U.S.
Attorney Lynne A. Battaglia apparently felt no need to institute an Exile-type

program. Although the number of firearms prosecutions dramatically increased
under her "Project DISARM," 2 her office declined to pursue "every gun offender
eligible for federal prosecution."253 Battaglia even declined to rely on ATF agents
(Lancaster, Pa.), July 10, 2000, at Al (describing efforts of city councilman and mayor to
bring Exile to Lancaster).
247.
See, e.g., Jeff Jones, Guns' Last Blast Is Best, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 1,
2000, at DI (describing Albuquerque's Project Exile); James Zambroski, U.S. Attorney Will
Review Gun Crimes: Jefferson Officials May Defer to Get HarsherPenalties, CouRiPR-J.
(Louisville. Ky.), Aug. 23, 2000, at Al (describing "Project Backfire" and noting that
"[u]nlike some other states, Kentucky law has no special punishment for crimes involving a
gun").
248.
See, e.g., James Brosnan, 4 in Poolfor U.S. Atty. Coleman's Job; Western
District Contenders Made Names in Public Service, Practice, COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), Jan. 28, 2001, Al (reporting that state district attorney general "wants
the U.S. attorney (in western Tennessee] to try even more federal gun law violations
because Tennessee laws 'just don't have much teeth').
249.
Local officials may have other concerns as well. Soon after Triggerlock was
announced, Delaware's Attorney General denounced the program as 'just one more chance
for the federal government to stomp on the prerogatives of his office and ensnare him in
bureaucratic red tape." Tom Watson, Project Triggerlock Takes Unfriendly Fire, LEGAL
TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1991, at 8.

250.
Maryland has, for some time, been ahead of most states in enacting gun
regulatory measures. See James G. Gimpel & Robin M. Wolpert, The Structure of Public
Support for Gun Control: The 1988 Battle over Question 3 in Maryland, in CHANGINO
POLITICS, supra,note 210, at 111, 111-12.
251.
PromisingStrategies to Reduce Gun Violence, supra note 92, at 19-25,
252.
See National Integrated Firearms Violence Reduction Strategy, supra note
197, app. A ("Project 'DISARM' is a federal, state and local comprehensive plan to reduce
gun-related violence by seeking federal prosecution for gun-carrying felons, based on a
collaborative case referral and screening process.'); PromisingStrategies to Reduce Gun
Violence, supra note 92, at142.
253.
Gail Gibson, Md. Gun Crimes Effort Debated; City Should Follow "Exile"
Program in Va., Ehrlich Says; Battaglia Defends "Disarm, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept, 28,
2000, at BI; Jefferson M. Gray, Editorial: Project Disarm Poses Problems, BALTIMORE
SUN, Dec. 27, 2000, at A13.
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to screen local gun arrests, preferring instead to have the police deal directly with
her assistants.' The principal opposition to her policies came not from local
enforcers, but from the state's Republican opposition' and from Republican Rep.
Robert L. Ehrlich (a critic of the Maryland gun measures and possible
gubernatorial candidate). The only novel twist in the political line-up here was
that local ATF officials publically declared their unhappiness with Battaglia's
screening arrangements, 8 which according to Ehrlich had occurred after the
officials provided him with statistics "that Battaglia thought underrepresented
[her] program's success.' With the election of George W. Bush, Ehrlich and
other state Republicans now look forward to the adoption of an Exile-type
2 60
program.
Once an Exile-type program is in place, need the maximal federal

commitment be permanent? Not necessarily. Virginia itself shows the possibility
of progress, with the Commonwealth dramatically moving to take more
responsibility for gun cases through its "Virginia Exile" program. By the summer
of 2000, according to one report, more than half of Richmond's gun cases over the
past year had been prosecuted in state court.61 But even here federal withdrawal
promises to be difficult, as reports of state inadequacies emerge. The conviction
rate for defendants prosecuted under Virginia Exile between July 1, 1999 (when
the program became law) and May 31, 2000, was forty percent, compared to an
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eighty percent conviction rate for the Exile cases taken to federal court.2" The
Richmond Commonwealth's Attorney has blamed Governor Gilmore and the
Virginia General Assembly for this poor showing, complaining that Virginia Exile
was "politically motivated" and haphazardly implemented. 63 U.S. Attorney Fahey
noted her disappointment.2' 6 The question remains, though, what her successor
will do in the face of this record, and whether a politically acceptable exit strategy
is even possible.
The point is more general. In Richmond, and elsewhere, unilateral federal
withdrawal would be hard even in the absence of the Republicans' proposed Exile
legislation. The U.S. Attorney would invariably face the prospect of yet another
horrendous shooting that cries out for the same harsh treatment given to previous
shootings.265 Federal enforcers will always have to consider the needs (and
capabilities) of local enforcers on whose cooperation they must depend in other
contexts. And legislators have never been shy about demanding federal
cooperation with the state and local authorities in their home districts. 2' 6 But any
difficulties that a U.S. Attorney would already face in phasing out an Exile-type
program would surely be magnified by intensive congressional supervision of the
sorts now being proposed. And the ultimate effect of congressional efforts to
institutionalize Exile would be to give state and local authorities a virtual blank
check on a range of federal enforcement assets and to shift control of these assets
away from Washington.
To be sure, Exile's champions have sought to alleviate some of the drain
on the strategic federal reserve. Early on, Republicans made clear that they would
support additional funding for U.S. Attorneys' Offices,267 and, although the drain
on ATF's resources may have been one of Exile's greatest attractions for them,
they even agreed to substantial outlays in the 2001 budget for that agency as
well.263 Moreover, state and local authorities in Virginia and elsewhere have stood
ready to second their own prosecutors as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to
relieve the pressure on those offices (and perhaps to ensure continued federal
interest).2 69 Had Gore become President, his administration might thus have been
able to continue the Clinton Administration's comprehensive anti-violence
262.
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strategy, committing agents to trafficking crimes as well as violent crime
enforcement.
What then are the institutional costs of Exile proliferation, if any? One
quick answer is that these measures do not address the burden that an enlarged
federal criminal docket places on the courts. This problem is one frequently cited
by critics of "over-federalization," who have charged that "the increasing criminal
caselav threatens to impair the quality of justice meted out in criminal cases and
significantly impairs federal judges' ability to perform their core constitutional
functions in civil cases." 270
One need not rest on such generalizations. A recent Administrative Office
study found not just a broad increase in federal firearms cases between 1989 and
1998, but a marked increase in the criminal justice resources required to deal with
each case:
In comparison to 1989, a firearms case filed in 1998 was more likely
to involve multiple defendants, more likely to take longer between
filing and disposition of the case, more likely than other types of
crimes to result in a jury trial, and more likely to result in a longer
2 1
prison sentence for the defendant(s).?7
The harsh criticism that the Eastern District of Virginia district judges leveled at
Project Exile2 is thus not surprising. 2n
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The longer (and less certain) answer is that, though their origins lie in a
tug of war with the Administration over gun enforcement assets, congressional
Exile proposals may not be so easily cabined. Perhaps Exile politics will become
more muted, under a President and Attorney General who have long championed
Exile and can be counted on to promote it as a matter of executive policy. Even so,
the real risk is that the congressional proposals raise the bar for showing
legislative outrage at criminal activity in areas of traditional state responsibility.
Until now, Congress spoke almost exclusively in the language of substantive
law-hence the carjacking statute, the domestic violence statute (whose criminal
provision remains unaffected by Morrison, as it has an element of interstate
travel 274), and proposed hate crime legislation. 27 1 Yet it was understood, and
probably intended, that enforcement of these provisions be highly discretionary.
Perhaps the gun debate is unique-because regulatory minimalists feel they lack
sufficient substantive outlets for expressing their condemnation of gun
violence 2 76 -but the key development in Exile politics is that the language of
condemnation has become a promise of maximal federal enforcement. Should
legislators, with the encouragement of local officials interested in shifting costs
and responsibilities to the federal government,2' begin to make such promises
with the same alacrity that they enacted substantive criminal provisions, they will
severely threaten the continued vitality of federal criminal institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, the political saga of Project Exile may not make for a
particularly significant chapter in the long gun control debate. The atmospherics
may be a little different, but the story is the usual one: Gun control minimalists
support offender-specific criminal enforcement as an alternative to broader
regulation of trafficking and access. And advocates of broader regulation embrace
such enforcement programs as well, both as a shield against minimalist criticism
and because their regulatory scheme naturally includes this sort of criminal
enforcement.
As a milestone in the accelerated devolution of centralized federal
criminal enforcement power, the saga of Exile may prove quite important, though.
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Only time will tell whether Exile politics are just a peculiar brand of gun control
rhetoric or whether they mark a new phase in efforts of legislators to put federal
enforcement resources at the disposal of state and local authorities. If the latter
proves true, then the legacy of Project Exile-itself an innovative federal
initiative-may be a serious challenge to the idea of federal enforcement policy in
the areas where federal, state, and local authority most overlap.
For nearly a half-century, policy-makers, courts, and academics have
wrestled with the general question: what role should the federal government play
in criminal enforcement? Or more particularly, to what extent should federal
enforcers be supporting state and local authorities, as opposed to vindicating
peculiarly federal interests or operating in areas where they have a comparative
advantage? The politics of Exile are a reminder that for a great many policymakers, the answers to these broad allocation questions will often, and perhaps
inevitably, be driven more by preferences about which laws should be enforced
(and to what degree) than by considerations of who should do the enforcing.
However, while legislators may seek to deploy firearms enforcement resources
based upon their conceptions of what gun control policy ought to be, their
decisions may have lasting implications for federal criminal enforcement more
generally.

